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Argument
A number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review of these theories
shows that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of
problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation
actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from
the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural)
simulationist accounts; but it fails to adequately address two other problems: the diversity
problem and the starting problem. It is argued that a narrative approach to empathy obviates all
these problems and offers a more parsimonious account.

In the past several years a number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of
empathy. These theories fall into two types: those that argue for a concept of empathy
which makes it equivalent or closely tied to what is considered the default form
of everyday social cognition (Decety 2005; Gallese 2001 and 2009; Goldman 2006;
Stueber 2006), and those that argue that empathy has a special status which makes it
distinct from everyday social cognition (de Vignemont and Singer 2006; de Vignemont
and Jacob 2012; Jacob 2011). In this paper I show that both types of simulationist
theories encounter insurmountable difficulties. I then propose, as an alternative, an
account of empathy informed by narrative practice.

Empathy by default
Much of the contemporary debate about empathy is driven by the neuroscience
of mirror neurons (MNs). Some theorists associate empathy with mirroring or
motor resonance processes themselves. According to Vittorio Gallese, for example,
understanding another person’s action relies on a neural mechanism that matches the
observed behavior with a behavior that the observer could execute. This lived bodily
motor equivalence between what we observe others doing, and the capabilities of our
own motor system allows us to use our own system as a model for understanding the
other’s action.
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Gallese’s argument is based on the neuroscience of MNs. “I submit that the
neural matching mechanism constituted by mirror neurons . . . is crucial to establish
an empathic link between different individuals” (Gallese 2001, 44). He appeals to
simulation theory to extend this model to include expressive aspects of movement that
give us access to the emotional states of others (e.g., Gallese and Goldman 1998). I
will return to the concept of simulation theory shortly. First, however, let me note
that one aspect of Gallese’s account is that he seemingly equates empathy with what
we might call standard social cognition, or what some theorists call mindreading (the
attribution of mental states to others). That is, Gallese doesn’t differentiate empathy
from our everyday encounters with others. He refers to his general model as the “shared
manifold hypothesis” and distinguishes three levels:
◦ The phenomenological level is the one responsible for the sense of similarity . . . that
we experience anytime we confront ourselves with other human beings. It could
be defined also as the empathic level.
◦ The functional level can be characterized in terms of simulation routines, as if processes
enabling models of others to be created.
◦ The subpersonal level is instantiated as the result of the activity of a series of mirror
matching neural circuits. (Gallese 2001, 45; see also Gallese 2003)
In this case, since the mirror system apparently is activated whenever we observe
another person engage in intentional action, empathy is a basic, common, and everyday
occurrence.
Jean Decety (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), in contrast to Gallese, contends that empathy
does not imply simply action- or emotion-resonance initiated by the action or emotion
state of the other. It also requires a minimal and more explicit comprehension of the
mental states of this person. He does not deny the importance of resonance systems,
especially in early infancy, and he accepts that we have an innate capacity to feel that
other people are “like us,” and that this is related to the possibility of experiencing
empathy. But we also quickly develop the capacity to put ourselves mentally in the
place of others, which can also be a form of simulation (Decety and Grèzes 2006).
Decety emphasizes that in this process difference is just as important as similarity.
Empathy is founded on our capacity to recognize that others are similar to us, but to
do so without confusing ourselves with the other. According to Decety, then, three
fundamental components interact to create empathy:
1. A component of motor resonance (resonance motrice) the activation of which is
generally automatic and nonintentional;
2. Insight into the subjective mental perspective of the other which may be controlled
and intentional;
3. The ability to differentiate between self and other. (Decety 2005; also Decety and
Jackson 2004)
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Gallese and Decety agree that basic resonance systems are in place, not only in early
infancy, but also in non-human primates. The major difference between their positions
concerns the second component. For Gallese, this component is not something more
than what the resonance systems already deliver, automatically; for Decety, this is the
“something extra” that is needed for empathic understanding. Once again, however, for
Decety, as for Gallese, empathy is equated with everyday mindreading. The difference
between Decety and Gallese is simply how they view the basic social cognitive process.
But it seems that for both theorists the explanation of basic social cognition is just an
explanation of empathy.
One possibility is that the “something extra” that Decety requires can be provided by
a higher-level simulation, most clearly described by a more traditional simulation theory
(ST). ST claims that in our attempt to understand others we employ our own mind as
a model on which we simulate the other’s mind by creating “as if” or pretend beliefs,
desires, intentional states (e.g., Goldman 2006; Gordon 1996; Heal 1996). We then
project such beliefs or desires to the other person, and this constitutes our mindreading
process. Traditional ST suggests that simulation is explicit (conscious or introspective,
involving imaginary enactments). Goldman, for example, describes it this way: “When
a mindreader tries to predict or retrodict someone else’s mental state by simulation, she
uses pretense or imagination to put herself in the target’s ‘shoes’ and generate the target
state” (Goldman 2005a; see Goldman 1989). In his most recent work, he continues to
specify that high-level simulation involves self-reflective, explicit processes (Goldman
2006, 147–48). Goldman explains high-level simulation as a form of pretense enactment
or “E-imagination.” E(nactive)-imagination just is that type of process that generates
pretend states which, in simulation, resemble the mental states of the other person.
If, however, as Goldman proposes, simulation describes a standard strategy for our
everyday social cognition, is this also the same as empathy? Goldman often equates
simulation and empathy, calling ST “empathy theory” (ibid., 17); “interpersonal mental
simulation [is] also called empathizing” (ibid., 205; see also ibid., 291). Goldman
(2011) claims that “the term ‘empathize’ [is] roughly equivalent to ‘simulate’ (in an
inter-subjective fashion)” and that “empathy is a key to mindreading . . ., the most
common form of mindreading.” In other places he recognizes that empathy may be
distinguished from mindreading. Thus, he poses the question: “What is the relationship
between mentalizing and other forms of social cognition? For example, how is it related
to empathy?” (ibid., 21). One possible answer, which Goldman seems to favor, is that
mentalizing or mindreading is equivalent to empathy, but to make this equation he
subtracts certain things that other theorists might want to include in a definition of
empathy: “mindreading is an extended form of empathy (where this term’s emotive
and caring connotation is bracketed)” (ibid., 4). Thus he can qualify other forms of
empathy as affective or emotional empathy.
Karsten Stueber also equates empathy with simulation and claims that empathy is
central and “epistemically essential” to our understanding of other agents (Stueber
2006, 131; also idem 2012). Like Goldman’s distinction between low-level and
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high-level simulation, Stueber distinguishes between basic and re-enactive empathy.
Basic empathy is a perceptual phenomenon that “allows us to directly recognize what
another person is doing or feeling” when observing her facial expressions or behavior
(Stueber 2006, 147). Like Gallese, he argues that basic empathy is linked to the activity
of the MN system. Basic empathy, however, is not sufficient to “explain and predict a
person’s behavior in complex social situations” or to provide “a full grasp of all mental
concepts that we attribute to the typical adult” (ibid.). Accordingly, in a similar way to
Decety, Stueber contends that we require something more; namely, reenactive empathy.
The “something extra” that comes along with reenactive empathy is identified as more
sophisticated mindreading abilities. This requires a higher-order simulation of thoughts
or mental states taken as reasons for action.
For all of these theorists, whether they distinguish between low-level, neural
simulation, and high-level simulation of the explicit mindreading sort, or not, there
seems to be no good distinction between our ordinary everyday processes of social
cognition and empathy. MN activation seems to be involved in providing a basic,
automatic, simulative understanding of the immediate bodily expressions of the other
person, and some kind of more explicit simulation routine apparently allows us to grasp
the mental states that motivate the other person’s actions. In all cases, this is meant
to be a description of our everyday understanding of others, and this is equated with
empathy at one level or the other, or both levels. Social cognition is, by default, a form
of empathy. That is, empathy is our basic and default way of understanding others,
and over and above this it has no special status. Yet, saying that I empathize with you,
seems to suggest more than just understanding your mental state; it seems to mean
more than simply perceiving that you are in pain, even if this perception is informed
by an embodied resonance.

Empathy with a special status
In contrast to the thinkers already mentioned, Frédérique de Vignemont, Tania Singer,
and Pierre Jacob (de Vignemont and Singer 2006; de Vignemont and Jacob 2012; Jacob
2011) have clearly distinguished empathy from everyday mindreading. De Vignemont
and Singer offer the following definition in terms of a set of collectively sufficient
conditions for empathy.
There is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another
person’s state; (iii) this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another
person’s affective state; (iv) one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own
affective state. (de Vignemont and Singer 2006, 435)

The second condition seemingly distinguishes empathy from sympathy: the former
involves being in the same or similar affective state as the other; the latter involves
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being in a different affective state (e.g., I feel sorry that you are in pain). Jacob specifies
it further as the interpersonal similarity condition, “arguably the major assumption of
the simulation-based approach to empathy” (Jacob 2011, 521). The third condition,
specifies the affective state as a vicarious experience – e.g., I feel vicarious pain or “as
if” pain, rather than real, physiological pain caused by bodily injury. De Vignemont
and Jacob contend that the capacity for creating vicarious experiences is based on what
Goldman calls e-imagination, which, as we’ve seen, involves the running of off-line,
high-level (i.e., explicit, conscious) simulations (de Vignemont and Jacob 2012; Jacob
2011). The fourth condition, which Jacob calls the ascription condition, distinguishes
empathy from emotional contagion, which typically happens unbeknownst to the
subject. Taken together, the second, third, and fourth conditions make empathy a
form of simulation. The first condition, however, which Jacob calls the affectivity
condition, distinguishes empathy from standard mindreading, the more theoretical or
detached ways of understanding others, whether based on theoretical inference or
simulation routines: “in a standard process of mindreading [e.g.,] another’s pain, one
forms the belief that another is in pain. Believing that another is in pain is different
from experiencing empathetic pain” (Jacob 2011, 523–24).
De Vignemont and Jacob also add a fifth condition: the caring condition: in empathy
one must care about the target’s affective life. As Jacob explains this, empathy depends
on a consideration of context; it is not the default response to my simple awareness of
your affective state. Rather, empathy depends on a top-down modulation and requires
that the empathizing subject cares or is concerned about the other. Empathy is otherdirected in this regard.
For clarity, let me summarize these five conditions.
1. The affectivity condition: there is no empathy unless both target and empathizer
experience some affective state. The affectivity condition distinguishes both
empathetic and sympathetic experiences from standard mindreading.
2. The inter-personal similarity condition: there is no empathy unless the target’s and the
empathizer’s affective states stand in a similarity relation to each other (i.e., both
experience pain or both experience fear).
3. The vicarious state condition: the empathic state involves an “as if” or vicarious
affective state, generated by the empathizer’s imaginative portrayal of another
person’s affective state.
4. The ascription condition: there is no empathetic understanding unless the empathizer
knowingly ascribes the affective state to the target.
5. The caring condition: the empathizer must be led to care about the target’s affective
life because of context.
Zahavi and Overgaard (2011) have pointed to some perplexities involved in some of
these conditions. They argue that condition (2) does not distinguish empathy from
sympathy, as claimed by de Vignemont et al. If A feels sad for his friend B because
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B is angry about some injustice done to her, on condition (2) this would be a case of
sympathy but not empathy since A and B are in different affective states. If, however, A
feels sad for B because B is sad about the injustice, then this would count as empathy.
Zahavi and Overgaard suggest that this is wrongheaded since A is in exactly the same
affective state whether B is angry or sad, and they reason that it would be odd to say
that A is empathizing in one case but not in the other, since the only change is in B. I
think there are several interesting problems tied up with this objection.
First, it seems correct to say that if A feels sad for B in either case, A is sympathizing.
There is, however, a distinction that needs to be made between feeling sad for the
other, and feeling (vicariously) the sadness of the other, which is a feeling with the
other. Proponents of condition (2) might consider the latter (feeling sad with B,
or more generally, feeling whatever emotion B is feeling) empathy, and the former
(feeling sad for B) sympathy. One way that we could read condition (2) is as specifying
similarity not with respect to the purely phenomenal aspect of the experience (sadness
as a phenomenal state may, or may not be similar in A and B), but with respect to
its intentionality. That is, for empathy, A’s sadness should have a similar intentional
structure as B’s sadness. In the case of empathy, the sadness is, in part, about injustice done
to B – and this is a similar intentional structure for both B’s sadness and A’s sadness.
Importantly, the intentional structure is similar but not identical, since A and B are in
different situations, B having actually suffered the injustice B is sad about, while A has
not.
Let me add that according to a phenomenological view the phenomenality of a state
may be intricately tied with its intentionality, so in this example the sadness in both
A and B may be phenomenally characterized by a certain tinge of outrage because it
is about injustice rather than about some accident that has befallen B. In the case of
sympathy, however, A’s sadness may be just sadness for B, without the outrage that B
is feeling about the injustice. A might think that in fact there was no injustice, but still
be sympathetic about B’s emotional upset. The important difference between empathy
and sympathy is in the intentional structure of the affective state.
Empathy: A feels sad [and/or outrage] about the injustice done to B, knowing that B also
feels sad [and perhaps outrage] about the injustice done to her (A’s feeling has a similar
intentional structure as B’s affective state).
Sympathy: A feels sad for B, who is sad [and perhaps outraged] about an injustice done to
B (dissimilar intentional structure).

This also raises an issue that strongly qualifies condition (2), namely, whether the
respective affective states have to be strictly isomorphic or even similar in regard to their
phenomenality. Isn’t similarity with respect to intentionality sufficient? For example, if
A is outraged (but not sad) about the injustice that B has suffered, knowing that B is
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simply sad (but does not feel outrage) about the injustice, it would seem odd to claim
that A is not empathizing with B.
Finally, it is important to recognize that both empathy and sympathy are
intersubjective phenomena and that as such the particular state of the other person
will make a difference. Although Zahavi and Overgaard suggest that it is odd or
wrongheaded to think that the only difference between whether A is empathizing or
sympathizing is determined by the affective state of B, I would suggest that this is not so
odd or wrongheaded if we take seriously the idea that empathy is not simply defined as
an individual’s internal mental or affective state, but is an intersubjective phenomenon.
Empathy depends on the intersubjective relation between A and B, which is different
if B is experiencing one affective state rather than another. If A feels sad about an
injustice done to B, because A thinks that B is sad because an injustice has been done
to her, but in fact no injustice has been done, and B is in fact not sad, should we call
this a case of empathy or misunderstanding? In this case there simply is no similarity
between A’s affective state and B’s affective state, and on condition (2), no empathy. If
A did this sort of thing habitually, would we say that A is a very empathic person rather
than someone who habitually misunderstands others?
These considerations also put pressure on condition (3), the vicarious state condition.
Perhaps the idea that the empathic state involves only an “as if” or simulated affective
state is motivated by the example on which de Vignemont and Jacob focus – the
example of pain. It’s not clear that this condition applies to all forms of empathy,
however. Indeed, on this point, condition (3) comes into direct contradiction with
condition (1). In terms of the continuing example, it seems likely that A’s sadness
and outrage about the injustice done to B is not a vicarious state but a very real one.
If it were not a real sadness and outrage, seemingly required by condition (1), but a
vicarious affective state, required by condition (3), someone might be tempted to call
it a simulation of empathy, not the real thing at all. Are the following statements of
empathy, or simply statements of understanding?
(a) “I understand your outrage because if I were in your position I would be outraged
too.”
(b) “I understand your outrage because I’ve imagined being in your situation and am
experiencing vicarious outrage as a result.”
(c) “Really, it’s as if I’m outraged at what they have done to you.”
To experience vicarious, or “as if,” or pretend outrage doesn’t seem to require being
in an affective state of outrage at all. If there is any difference between these statements,
it doesn’t seem as great as the difference between them and the following:
(d) “Really, like you, I’m outraged at what they have done to you.”
(a), (b), and (c) seem to be on a par in regard to the vicarious status of the affective
state. (d) is different; the affective state is a real one. To exclude (d) as a case of empathy,
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following condition (3), seems too restrictive and indeed seems to cheapen empathy.
It doesn’t cost me much to empathize with you since I only have to simulate the affect
rather than really feel it. To call (d) a case of contagion rather than empathy also seems
incorrect since the affective state is other-directed – it’s not about me, but about you
and what they have done to you.
What I’ve identified as problems with Zahavi and Overgaard’s objection to (2) are
also related to their objections to condition (5). They rightly suggest that by phrasing
the condition in terms of “care” de Vignemont and Jacob seem to signify something
closer to sympathy and at the same time seem to require that empathy always be
a positive phenomenon. The example of the expert torturer empathizing with the
victim’s pain in order to perfect the torture seems to be ruled out. These objections
are easily responded to by substituting words like “concern,” or “interest,” which may
be either positive or negative (I may be concerned for/interested in your welfare, or
interested in seeing you suffer even more). In that case we could call this the concern
condition: the empathizer must be concerned with the target’s affective life because of
context.
It’s important to highlight the significance of context here, and de Vignemont and
Jacob rightly do so. With respect to the notion of context it should be clear that
an adequate understanding of the other’s situation (e.g., that B did in fact suffer an
injustice) actually specifies the intentional structure of the empathizer’s (A’s) affective
experience. If A doesn’t get the context right, then A’s affective experience may be
entirely off target. If this could still be considered a concern on A’s part for B, it is
nonetheless motivated by a misunderstanding of the situation. Moreover, it means that
there is no similarity between A’s affective state and B’s affective state, and no empathy
on condition (2).

Evidence against simulation
I want to set aside these issues temporarily in order to focus on some more general
problems involving simulation models of mindreading. It would seem that if, as in
Gallese, Decety, Goldman, and Stueber, empathy is equivalent to mindreading, and
mindreading is based on simulation, then any problems with a simulation theory (ST)
of mindreading will be problems for a simulationist view of empathy as well. That’s
the first issue, and to address that I will quickly summarize in this section what I have
said elsewhere about ST and mindreading (Gallagher 2007 and 2008). Alternatively,
if we follow de Vignemont, Singer, and Jacob and make a clear distinction between
everyday mindreading skills, as they are portrayed in the ST literature, and empathy, as
having a special status – that is, if we reject the view that empathy is a kind of default
mindreading – and yet still retain the idea that empathy is a form of simulation, then
the question is whether the critique of ST extends to this view of empathy. I’ll discuss
this in the following section.
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According to the traditional version of ST, as we’ve mentioned, one understands
another person by employing one’s own mind as a model on which to run simulation
routines. This may be a conscious, introspective process, or it may be so habitual that
we do it without being aware of it. Goldman identifies three steps in this simulation
process.
First, the attributor creates in herself pretend states intended to match those of the target.
In other words, the attributor attempts to put herself in the target’s “mental shoes.” The
second step is to feed these initial pretend states [e.g., beliefs] into some mechanism of
the attributor’s own psychology . . . and allow that mechanism to operate on the pretend
states so as to generate one or more new states [e.g., decisions]. Third, the attributor
assigns the output state to the target . . . [e.g., we infer or project the decision to the
other’s mind]. (Goldman 2005b, 80–81; see Shanton and Goldman 2010 for a similar
formulation)

In this kind of high-level simulation, the creation of pretend beliefs is accomplished
by the use of E-imagination (Goldman 2006). He further distinguishes high-level
simulation from low-level simulation which he associates with neural processes in the
mirror system that are activated in two conditions: (1) when we engage in intentional
action; (2) when we observe others engage in such action. As we’ve seen, Gallese,
Goldman, and others identify MN activation as a form of neural simulation which puts
our own motor system into a similar action state as the state that we observe in the
actions of the other person, facilitating our understanding of their intentions and/or
mental states.
My criticisms of the simulation theory of social cognition involve both high-level
and low-level simulation. Here is a brief summary of four objections to ST.
(1) The diversity problem
This is a problem that pertains to both high- and low-level simulations. Simulation
depends specifically on one’s own first-person experience as the basis for what goes
into the simulation. We depend on our own prior experience to have a sense of what
the other person may be thinking in a particular situation. We start with our own
experience and project some tentative empathic conception of what must be going
on in the other’s mind. The question is, when we project ourselves imaginatively into
the perspective of the other, when we put ourselves in his or her shoes, do we really
attain an understanding of the other or are we merely reiterating ourselves? Simulation
is often described in the following way: “In all cases, observing what other people
do or feel is transformed into an inner representation of what we would do or feel
in a similar, endogenously produced, situation” (Keysers and Gazzola 2006, 394). But
how does knowing what we would do help us know what someone else would do?
Indeed, many times we are in a situation where we see what someone is doing, and
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know that we would do it differently, or perhaps, not do it at all. Given the vast
variety of actions, beliefs, experiences, and feelings that people experience, it seems
presumptuous to suggest that one’s own limited first-person experience is capable of
capturing that diversity. There are thus two points to be made: (a) Consistent simulation
would introduce a consistent first-person bias into our understandings of others, i.e.,
we would be led to think that they must do what we would do, or experience what
we would experience. (b) Our own experiences, no matter how extensive, can never
meet the diversity of experiences had by the many others that we encounter, even in
our own culture.
(2) The developmental problem
The simulation processes found in explicit, high-level versions of ST are too cognitively
complex to account for the infant’s ability to understand the intentions of others. At
this point one should cite recent experiments on 15-month-old infants’ attribution of
false-beliefs (see, e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, and He 2010). In a series of experiments,
developmental psychologists have shown that young infants are able to differentiate
correct and incorrect answers in false-belief scenarios. The experimenters use average
looking time rather than verbal reports. Here the debate on how to interpret such
results raises the developmental problem. Is it possible for the infant to run a high-level
simulation routine? There is not much support for this idea, and on this score, perhaps a
neural ST would have the advantage. The neural simulation account, however, indicates
nothing about the concept of false belief; that is, there is nothing in MNs that code for
false belief.1 A more basic issue, however, is whether we should take MN activation to
be a form of simulation, and this involves the following problems.
(3) The problem of pretense and instrumental control
This problem pertains to the low-level neural ST interpretation of mirror neurons. If
we accept the traditional definition of simulation proposed by ST, then two aspects are
important: (1) pretense, and (2) instrumental control. Both the instrumental and the
pretense aspects are essential to most definitions of simulation and are clearly reflected
in Goldman’s explanation (Goldman 2002, 7): Simulation involves “pretend states”
where, “by pretend state I mean some sort of surrogate state, which is deliberately
adopted for the sake of the attributor’s task . . . In simulating practical reasoning,
the attributor feeds pretend desires and beliefs into her own practical reasoning
1
For a more detailed discussion of metarepresentational solutions (e.g., Carruthers 2009), simulationist
approaches (e.g., Herschbach 2007), the behavioral rules view (Ruffman and Perner 2005), and an alternative
enactive approach to the false-belief experiments with young infants, see Gallagher 2011b.
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system.” Simulation is thus characterized in terms of a mechanism or model that
we manipulate or control in order to understand something to which we do not have
instrumental access. The aspect of pretense seems essential for simulation if it is to be
distinguished from a theoretical model or a simple practice of reasoning (see Fisher
2006).
It is clear, however, that neither of these conditions is met by MNs. First, in regard
to the instrumental aspect, if simulation is characterized as a process that I (or my brain)
instrumentally use(s), manipulate(s), or control(s), then whatever is happening in the
automatic implicit processes of motor resonance is not simulation. We, at the personal
level, do not manipulate or control the activated brain areas – in fact, we have no
instrumental access to neuronal activation, and we can’t use it as a model. Nor would
it be more than an analogy to say that the brain itself is using a model or methodology,
or that one set of neurons makes use of another set of neurons. Indeed, in precisely the
intersubjective circumstances that we are considering, these neuronal systems do not
activate themselves; rather, they are activated by the other person’s action. The other
person has an effect on us and elicits this activation. It is not us (or our brain) initiating a
simulation; it’s the other who does this to us via a perceptual elicitation.
Second, in sub-personal mirror processes there is no pretense. What these neurons
register cannot involve pretense in the way required by ST because MNs are said to
be neutral in regard to agency. That is, MNs are activated both when I engage in
intentional action and when I see you engage in intentional action; no first- or thirdperson specification is involved (Gallese 2005; Hurley 2005; Jeannerod and Pacherie
2004). In that case, it is not possible for them to register my intentions as pretending
to be your intentions; there is no “as if” of the sort required by ST because there is no
‘I’ or ‘you’ represented.
(4) The matching problem
In response to just these kinds of worries one could argue that the instrumental and
pretense conditions are not necessary conditions for simulation, and that a necessary
condition for simulation is something more minimal. Goldman (2006), for example,
with respect to the concept of neural simulation, acknowledges a discrepancy between
the ST definition of simulation and the working of subpersonal mirror processes. To
address this discrepancy Goldman and Sripida propose a minimal and generic definition
of simulation.
The general idea of simulation is that the simulating process should be similar, in
relevant respects, to the simulated process. Applied to mindreading, a minimally necessary
condition is that the state ascribed to the target is ascribed as a result of the attributor’s
instantiating, undergoing, or experiencing, that very state. In the case of successful
simulation, the experienced state matches that of the target. (Goldman and Sripida 2005,
208)
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This “direct matching hypothesis” involves an automatic neural resonance of the MN
system when observing the actions of others. Matching means “mapping the visual
representation of the observed action onto the motor representation of the same action”
(Rizzolatti et al., 661).
Let me suggest, however, against any version of ST that makes matching the primary
requirement, that the minimal condition of matching, or any simulation that one can
build on this, cannot be the pervasive or default way of attaining an understanding
of others. There are many cases of encountering others in which we simply do not
adopt, or find ourselves in, a motoric or emotional matching state. Furthermore, with
respect to neural ST, if simulation/matching were as automatic as MNs firing, then we
would not be able to attribute a state different from our own to someone else. But we
do this all the time. Also consider the difficulties involved if we were interacting with
more than one other person, or trying to understand others who are interacting with
each other. Is it possible to enter into the same, or what are likely different states, and
thereby simulate the neural/motor/mental/emotional states of more than one person
at the same time? Or can we alternate quickly enough, going back and forth from
one person to the other, if in fact our simulations must be such that we instantiate,
undergo, or experience, the states in question? How complicated does it get if there is
a small crowd in the room?
In addition to behavioral/phenomenological examples, we can point to recent
experiments that show that MN areas activated for producing a particular hand action
are not activated for observing that hand action in another – that is, MN activations
in such cases do not involve matching (Dinstein et al. 2008). Another experiment
demonstrated that learning works against matching. The experimenters trained subjects
to move their fingers in a manner incongruent with an observed hand; for example,
moving the little finger when they observed movement of the index finger. After
training, motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were greater in the little finger when index
finger movement was observed (Catmur, Walsh and Heyes 2007). Yet the subjects with
different MEP responses were not perceptually mistaken about which finger moved.
That is, the lack of matching in the motor system did not pre-empt recognition of
what the other person was doing. Csibra (2005) points out that conservatively, only
about one-third of mirror neurons show a one-to-one congruence. Newman-Norlund
et al. (2007, 55) suggest that activation of the broadly congruent mirror neurons may
represent a complementary action rather than a similar action. In that case they could
not be simulations defined on the matching hypothesis.

Can a simulation account of empathy avoid these problems?
The matching problem is one that Jacob (2008 and 2011) recognizes. His critique
of the MN version of low-level simulation parallels the one outlined in the
previous section (Jacob 2008). He further notes that simulation-based approaches to
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mindreading over-emphasize inter-personal similarity, at the expense of dissimilarities
between e.g., standard pain and empathetic pain. He argues that interpersonal
similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient for mindreading. However, he rightly
insists, “acceptance of a S-B (simulation based) model of empathy does not amount
to acceptance of a S-B model of mindreading” (ibid., 10); in other words, it is
one thing to reject the simulation-based approach to mindreading and another to
reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. While matching or inter-personal
similarity may not be necessary for mindreading, it does play an important role in
empathy.
De Vignemont, Singer, and Jacob can thus accept some of the criticisms of ST’s
conception of mindreading, but since they distinguish mindreading from empathy,
they can argue that these criticisms don’t go all the way through to the ST account
of empathy. For example, it’s clear that the phenomenological/behavioral objections
to conceiving of simulation as a kind of matching are worked out in terms of what
we think our everyday interactions with others are like. We normally respond to
others with complementary actions; we don’t typically respond by matching their
actions, even in a vicarious or covert way. The idea that we somehow match their
behavior doesn’t make sense in such contexts. But this doesn’t rule out the possibility
that we can match their behavior, for example, in the case of imitation or empathy.
ST overemphasizes intersubjective similarity when it comes to everyday mindreading,
but the idea that similarity or matching is not the case in those contexts does not
mean that a simulative matching state cannot characterize cases that involve imitation
or empathy. Hence, de Vignemont et al. can still maintain the inter-personal similarity
condition.
In our comments on the five conditions for empathy specified by de Vignemont
and Jacob, however, we noted that the similarity has more to do with the intentional
structures of the affective states than with their phenomenality. Similarity or matching
of intentional structure, then, may characterize empathy even if it doesn’t characterize
mindreading. Moreover, the worry about matching at the neural level is simply not
an issue since, for de Vignemont et al., empathy involves a high-level simulation.
Accordingly the matching problem is no problem for this simulationist view of empathy.
What about the other problems?
For a similar reason, the problem of pretense and instrumental control is not a
worry for this model, since again this problem only pertains to neural ST. To the
extent that empathy involves high-level simulation, then pretense, and instrumental
control – top-down modulation, as Jacob puts it – seem clearly to be part of the
possible processes involved. This leaves the developmental and diversity problems. In
regard to these problems, however, we can start to see the limits of simulation, in the
sense that simulation by itself may not be enough to achieve empathy.
With respect to development, there is evidence that around the age of two years, a
number of things happen that lead to a capacity for empathic understanding. Decety
and Jackson note:
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It is around the 2nd year that empathy may be manifested in prosocial behaviors (e.g.,
helping, sharing, or comforting) indicative of concern for others. Studies of children in the
2nd year of life indicate that they have the requisite cognitive, affective, and behavioral
capacities to display integrated patterns of concern for others in distress (Bretherton,
Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway 1986). During this period of development, children
increasingly experience emotional concern “on behalf of the victim,” comprehend others’
difficulties, and act constructively by providing comfort and help (Zahn-Waxler, RadkeYarrow, Wagner, and Chapman 1992). (Decety and Jackson 2004)

What does it take for this kind of empathy to emerge? Can we say that at around
two years of age children start to gain an ability to employ simulation in the form of
E-imagination?
Goldman suggests that we should consider this early manifestation of empathy a case
of emotional contagion rather than E-imagination. He points to evidence that caring
behavior emerges even earlier than two years. A child of this age will appropriately
comfort his mother if she has a sore foot by showing concern, rubbing the foot, and
saying ‘hurt foot’ (Zahn-Wexlar and Radke-Yarrow 1982). Goldman concludes that
children of this age must engage in the right kind of mindreading for this empathic
behavior, but the right kind of mindreading is low-level, involving mirror neurons
(Goldman 2006, 291).
De Vignemont et al. argue that empathy is not equivalent to contagion or to
everyday mindreading. Nonetheless, behaviors described in the one- and two-year
olds may satisfy their criteria for empathy. The affectivity condition: both child and
the target experience an affective state (which distinguishes this phenomenon from
ordinary mindreading); the inter-personal similarity condition: we have this whether it is a
case of contagion or empathy; the caring condition: the child clearly cares that its mother
is in pain. It’s critical to ask whether this behavior meets the ascription condition, since
this is the condition, according to de Vignemont et al., that distinguishes empathy
from contagion. It seems clear that the child ascribes pain to his mother and does
not simply, unaware, wince and tense up in his own simulated pain, as one might
find in contagion. Accordingly it seems that de Vignemont et al. would have to call
this behavior empathy rather than contagion. Zahavi and Overgaard (2011), however,
suggest that contagion and conscious ascription are not incompatible. One might very
well wince and tense up as the result of seeing someone else in pain, but at the same
time consciously ascribe this same affective state to the other, and realize that one’s own
reaction is an effect of what one has just seen. The ascription does not make this any
less a case of contagion. It does seem unlikely that, as per the vicarious state condition,
we have a high-level simulation of the E-imagination sort involved; and Goldman
certainly doesn’t think so. One might ask, however, whether this condition can be met
without involving E-imagination, since the child’s pain on seeing his mother in pain
is certainly vicarious; it is not caused by a bodily injury to himself. As a result, even
on the criteria for empathy provided by de Vignemont et al., it’s not clear whether
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the behavior of the two-year-old should be called empathy, contagion, or both, unless
one insists on E-imagination as the necessary mechanism for empathy and shows that
E-imagination is not involved.
One question, then, for this account, is what allows for the development of Eimagination capabilities, which, on more standard views start at around four years
of age? Is it simply some improvement in neural resonance. After all, studies show
that the same brain areas are activated not only when we act and when we observe
action by another, but when we imagine ourselves or the other acting (Ruby and
Decety 2001; Grezes and Decety 2001). The development of neural resonance
processes, or mirroring, perhaps, leads to the ability to E-imagine the situation of
others.
I think we need to look elsewhere, however. The realization that the similarity
condition concerns the intentionality of the affective state points us in a specific direction.
It focuses attention on the situation of the other rather than on the phenomenal character
of their affective states. Understanding the other’s situation is, I will argue, facilitated
more by narrative than by simulation abilities.2
In this regard, we can point to a number of important developments in the child
before the age of two years, all of which contribute to the beginnings and the growth of
narrative competency in the child. At 12–18 months we see the development of secondary
intersubjectivity in which children start to see things in pragmatic contexts: objects start
to get their meaning from the way people interact with them. Children begin to make
sense of the world through their interaction with others. Around this time the ability
for mirror self-recognition emerges, and this provides the child with a more objective
sense of self, an important development in providing a more conceptual self-other
distinction, which, as Decety correctly insists, is important for empathy. In addition,
sometime between 15–24 months, children acquire language, or as Merleau-Ponty
(1962) puts it, language starts to acquire them, and this is accompanied by advances
in their communicative capacities. Finally, between 18–24 months, children start to
manifest ability for episodic and autobiographical memory (Howe 2000).
Along with and because of these developments comes a capacity for narrative
practices. It may be that two-year-olds work more from scripts than from full-fledged
narratives; their narratives have to be elicited by questions and prompts (Nelson
2003 and 2009). But from two to four years, children fine-tune their narrative
abilities by means of a further development of language ability and memory skills.
Through narratives we also learn from others and engage more fully in intersubjective
2
Some definitions of narrative are strict and exclusive, and others are so loose so as to include almost anything.
For our purposes it is important to distinguish narrative from folk psychological theory, where theory consists
of a collection of relatively timeless and general statements or rules thought to apply to the majority of cases,
and are applied only by inference to any particular case. Narrative, in contrast, has a temporal structure (some,
but not all, may involve a beginning, middle, and end) and is already tied to particular contexts. A narrative is
about some particular person or group, in some particular situation, acting and interacting in particular ways,
across some segment of time.
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sense-making. Children at two to four years “often ‘appropriate’ someone else’s story
as their own” (Nelson 2003, 31). Around four years of age children start to represent
the views of other people in their narratives, contrasting what they know about some
events, and what others know about the events (Nelson 1992; Perner 1992). As Dan
Hutto has pointed out, the fact that in most cultures children grow up surrounded
by stories that transmit cultural meanings and values initiates them into practices of
understanding reasons for action (Hutto 2008).
One possibility, then, is that the development of narrative competency contributes
to the capacity for E-imagination, and more generally for understanding situations.
E-imagination depends not simply on a resonance-simulation mechanism, but requires
a way to narratively frame the other person’s experience. We can see this more clearly
with respect to the diversity problem.
The diversity problem concerns the fact that, when faced with the variety of ways
people respond to situations, simulation depends narrowly on one’s own first-person
experience as its basis. If we depend on our own prior experience in order to sense
what the other person may be thinking in a particular situation, the question is whether
we really attain an understanding of the other or are merely projecting ourselves. Faced
with the diversity of people, how can our own relatively narrow experience be the
basis for understanding them?
On the one hand, the answer to the diversity problem may simply be “yes.” Our
comprehension of diversity is in fact a real problem. Various studies show that we
are more inclined to empathize with people who are closer and more like ourselves
than with those who are more distant and more unlike ourselves (see Boltanski 1999;
Chouliaraki 2006; Gutsell and Inzlich 2010). On the one hand, the idea that empathy
is a form of simulation may actually explain why this is a problem. And it may be an
unsolvable problem simply because it is part of our human nature. It’s more a human
problem than a problem for the ST approach to empathy. On the other hand, it seems
that it is possible in some cases to empathize with those who are not like us. We can
empathize with monsters or aliens from other planets, as portrayed in film, and we
can empathize with humans who live in far away lands and who are very different.
This is possible, however, only when we know their stories – only when we can frame
their behavior in a narrative that informs us about their history or their situation. This
shows us, also, why we can more readily empathize with those who are close and
similar to us. We already know the general lines of their stories. We have an easier time
placing them in a narrative framework. In this respect, and specifically with respect
to getting the intentionality right, narrative seems necessary for empathy. Narratives
provide understanding of diverse contexts; they give us access to contexts that are
broader than our own contexts and that allow us to understand a broad variety of
situations. If we characterize empathy as a form of simulative E-imagination, then at
the very least we need to realize that E-imagination does not float in thin air like a
balloon on a thin string of first-person experience – it is tied to the ground by the
particular contextualized details that are provided by narratives.
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Narratives
I want to move this argument one step further, however, to show that understanding
the nature of narrative competency gives us good reason to give up the simulationist
account of empathy altogether.
Cultural narratives, made available to the child, or narratives that are generated in
interactive contexts by others, and eventually by the child, are, in the first place, stories
about actions and interactions. They often include reasons for acting. That is, they tell
us about people in specific situations, what they do, how they interact with others, and
they sometimes indicate the motives people have for doing what they do (see Hutto
2008). Through such narratives we gain interpretive insights into the actions of others.
Narratives, however, give us more than their contents. They give us a form or structure
that we can use in understanding others. That is, we learn from narrative how to frame
an understanding of others. We start to see others engaged in their actions, not simply
in terms of the immediate and occurrent context. We start to see them as engaged in
longer-term projects (plots) that add meaning to what they are doing.
When children listen to stories, or see them enacted (in various media), or when
they themselves play-act3 (and the same applies to adults who are exposed to parables,
plays, myths, novels, films, television, etc.), they become familiarized with sets of
characters and with a range of ordinary or extra-ordinary situations, and the sorts
of actions appropriate to those situations. All of this helps to shape their sense of
possibilities and their expectations. An education in narratives of many sorts provides
knowledge of what actions are acceptable and in what circumstances, what sort of
events are important and noteworthy, what accounts can account for action, and what
kind of explanations constitute the giving of good reasons. In other words, narratives
instill norms and shape our understanding of what we, and others, are doing.4
Narratives provide us with what can be called, following terminology suggested by
Bruner and Kalmar (1998), a massive hermeneutical background (Gallagher 2011a). This
background consists of a learned set of skills and practical knowledge concerning what
to expect from people, and how to deal with them.5 This background helps to resolve
3
“Children’s first narrative productions occur in action, in episodes of symbolic play by groups of peers,
accompanied by – rather than solely though – language. Play is an important developmental source of narrative”
(Nelson 2003, 28; also see Richner and Nicolopoulou 2001).
4
One reviewer asked what happens if the extant narratives are unhelpful; might we fall back on simulation as
a way to begin to construct a new narrative? This is an important question. It’s clear that we sometimes fail to
understand the other person, and this may be due to a failure of narrative to provide the proper resources in
particular cases. I would argue that breaking out of extant narratives in these contexts involves communicative
competency, and narrative competency once again. A retreat to simulation, if we take that to mean reliance on
one’s first-person experience, will not necessarily work (although in some cases it may). It seems clear, however,
in many intersubjective contexts one can ask questions and seek responses from those concerned, and out of
this communicative practice one can start to reframe a narrative that will allow for understanding.
5
Narrative is one important source for this knowledge. Our ongoing interaction (including communicative
practices) with others is another important source. In this paper I have not emphasized the role of strong
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what I call the “starting problem” in social cognition (a version of the frame problem),
which one can see, for example, in Goldman’s description of the first step involved
in running a simulation routine. “First, the attributor creates in herself pretend states
intended to match those of the target. In other words, the attributor attempts to put
herself in the target’s ‘mental shoes’” (Goldman 2005b, 80–81).6
The first step seems tricky. How do I know which pretend state (belief or desire)
matches what the other person has in mind. Indeed, isn’t this what simulation is
supposed to explain? If I already know what state matches the target, then the problem
of understanding others, as defined by ST, would already be solved. One solution
to the starting problem is that I know what simulation to run for any particular
situation because I draw on a rich store of narratives, and on the massive hermeneutical
background that informs my understanding. Simulationist versions of mindreading or
of empathy don’t say much about this; they don’t explain how we get this background,
what sort of thing it is, or how precisely it comes into play when we attempt to use
E-imagination or simulation. Indeed, ST doesn’t want to say much about it because
our reliance on narrative competency actually reduces the need for simulation and
displaces it as the primary explanation of everyday social cognition and empathy.
Simulation is strongly set on our first-person experiences; it draws on resources
that belong exclusively to the simulator. I, in a process of simulation, put myself in
the other’s situation and ask what I would do if I were in that situation. I reduce
the other person to something close to who I am and what my experiences mean: I
start with a version of what I would do if I were in the other’s situation (Keysers and
Gazzola 2008). But, again, one should ask why knowing what I would do gives me
insight into what anyone else might do. Moreover, as de Vignemont and Jacob suggest,
empathy, in contrast to contagion, and I would suggest, in contrast to simulation itself,
is other-directed. If we take this other-directedness in a strong sense, then it is not just
that empathy is oriented to the other in a way that allows me to reduce the other to
my own experience; rather, it means that I am open to the experience and the life
of the other, in their context, as I can understand it, not in terms of my own narrow
experience, but in terms that can be drawn from a diversity of narratives that inform
my understanding.7

interaction in our everyday encounters with people, primarily because I’ve been focusing on the simulation
account of empathy. As my criticism of the ST account of mindreading suggests, I think that ST fails as a general
account of social cognition, and more generally I argue against the idea that mindreading of any sort is our basic
form of social cognition. A more parsimonious account, in my view, is interaction theory (see De Jaegher, Di
Paulo, and Gallagher 2010; Gallagher 2001; idem 2004; idem 2005).
6
Stueber indicates a similar first step: “A matching phase in which I imaginatively adopt your perspective of the
world by entertaining your beliefs and desires and by quarantining my beliefs and desires that we do not share”
(Stueber 2012, 57).
7
Stueber (2008) suggests that the importance of narrative is simply to provide “hints and clues” to enhance the
simulation (empathetic reenactment) process. My suggestion here is that reliance on narrative resources actually
opens up the process to a more enriched and non-simulationist narrative practice.

Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative

373

Jacob (2011), in defending his simulationist view of empathy raises some objections
to the narrative view. In response to the claim that we gain ability in understanding
others through narrative practice, he points to the developmental literature, discussed
above, which shows that young infants (at 15 months, and even younger),8 and therefore
without narrative competency, pass false-belief tests, where violation of expectation
(VOE) is measured by average looking times or where the expected correct answer
is measured by anticipatory looking (AL) in that direction (Southgate et al., 2010).
The question posed by Jacob is this: How could narrative competency explain capacity
to pass AL and VOE false-belief tasks in young infants? There are three points to be
made in response to this question. First, no one claims that narrative competency is
required for this kind of early performance on false-belief tasks. Narrative may be
involved in many of the false-belief tests given to three-to-five year olds, and narrative
competency may be required to pass those tests, at least in the sense that the child
has to be able to follow the narrative to understand the question (Gallagher and
Hutto 2008). But this does not apply to the kind of tasks at stake in the experiments
with young infants. Second, with respect to the question of what capacity does
explain the ability of young infants, there is ongoing debate. Some propose a form
of low-level simulation; Carruthers (2009) suggests that infants at this age already are
capable of metarepresentation and inference; Ruffman and Perner (2005) appeal to
the infant’s use of behavior rules (e.g. “people look for objects where they last saw
them”) gained via statistical learning abilities. Alternatively, it’s possible to develop
an enactivist account of the infant’s behavior on these tests (see Gallagher 2011b for
further discussion). Third, to be clear, whatever the correct answer is, we can set aside
this issue about young infants and false beliefs, since, according to de Vignemont,
Jacob, and Singer, it has nothing to do with empathy. They claim that empathy is
not a matter of low-level processes (of whatever kind), which are surely the processes
involved in early false-belief tests.9 Thus, these experiments have nothing to do with
the claims made here about empathy or narrative. Within the framework of the de
Vignemont et al. theory of empathy, the question about false-belief paradigms in
infants falls into the category of mindreading or contagion, and is therefore beside the
point.

8
Jacob cites Surian et al. 2007, who report that 13-month-olds looked longer when a caterpillar approached
the true location of its preferred food, after the food was hidden there in the absence of the caterpillar; and He
and Baillargeon (2011), who report that infants looked reliably longer when an agent, who had not seen the
shortening of the length of a toy, retrieved the toy from the shorter of a pair of boxes.
9
Unless one wants to claim that high-level mindreading might be possible for the infant, as hinted by Goldman
who suggests that the early false-belief data may motivate some revision in defining high-level mindreading as
“late” developing (Goldman 2006, 146, n. 20). Even in this case, one would have to decide whether we should
call this empathy rather than mindreading.

374

Shaun Gallagher

Conclusion: Narrative and empathy
Understanding persons in the context of their situation – having a sense of what
their story is – is essential to forming an empathic attitude toward them. Recent
studies of altruistic behavior, motivated by empathy, bear this out. Empathic reactions
are stronger when we understand the personal situation of an individual than if we
have abstract, detached, or merely statistical information about the plight of others
(Slovic 2007; Small et al. 2007). To make clear precisely how narrative contributes to
empathy, let’s briefly reconsider the five conditions for empathy specified by de
Vignemont et al.
1. The affectivity condition: there is no empathy unless both target and empathizer
experience some affective state.
This condition may not be as clear or as certain as it first seems. Consider, for example,
seeing someone sitting pensively on a rock next to the river, watching the water flow
by. Our perception of the other person sitting there is not, by itself, sufficient for
empathy. We don’t know if he is enjoying nature, thinking about whether to ask his
friend to marry him, solving a math problem, or contemplating suicide. What should
we feel? It’s only when we know some details about his story that we can start to
empathize. That may lead us into a certain affective state, or not. Suppose we learn that
he is trying to decide whether to propose to his girlfriend. We can know what that’s
like in general, since we may be familiar with these kinds of deliberations – perhaps
we’ve read enough literature, perhaps we’ve talked with friends in similar situations,
perhaps we’ve even engaged in this kind of deliberation ourselves. One might consider
our understanding of the difficulty involved in this kind of deliberation to be a kind
of empathy – perhaps an intellectual empathy in which we appreciate the difficulty of
the deliberation, since it seems to be a major life decision and there are all kinds of
factors involved. These factors may include, perhaps, the question of whether the guy
loves the girl, or loves someone else but has a different reason for proposing. What is
the affective state here that we have to feel in order to empathize? Is there a specific
feeling of trying to work through a difficult decision? Or of being uncertain? Or of
trying to solve a difficult math problem? At the very least it’s not clear that in every
case of empathy we have to be in an affective state in any strong sense, or that we
cannot empathize with another’s non-affective state of making a difficult decision, or
with their non-affective attitude, or even with the intellectual difficulty they might
be having in solving a difficult mathematical problem. Yet it also seems right to say
that empathy involves more than what Hogan calls “the intellectual or imaginative
apprehension of another’s condition or state of mind” (Hogan 1969, 308).
One could easily trivialize condition (1) by maintaining that in any case a person
is always in some affective state or other. Assuming that condition (1) involves more
than this trivial claim, one could strengthen it by dropping the requirement that
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the other person must be in some affective state, and focusing on the empathizer’s
affective state, namely, the affective state of empathy itself. Isn’t empathy, regardless
of whatever other affective state it may involve, itself an affective state? That is, one
can understand empathy not as necessarily taking up a secondary affective state – e.g.,
the sadness or outrage I feel along with you – but as being its own primary and
irreducible affective state – the state of feeling empathy.10 In this regard empathy is a
kind of intersubjective affect similar to the feeling of solidarity. Whereas the feeling of
solidarity may involve my feeling of being with you in the spirit of a certain project,
the feeling of empathy involves my feeling of being with you with respect to your
situated experience. Solidarity, however, unlike empathy, may involve the expectation
of reciprocity; if I feel solidarity with you, then I would expect you to feel solidarity
with me. Also, solidarity may be transitive – if I feel solidarity with you, and you feel
solidarity with a third person, then, as long as the solidarity is about the same type of
project, I should feel solidarity with the third person also. Empathy involves neither
reciprocity nor transitivity. That empathy involves its own primary and irreducible
affective state of feeling with another frees it from the requirement that it also must
involve some secondary affective state – e.g., the real or simulated copy of the other
person’s affective state of sadness, outrage, etc. One could experience empathy for
the other person’s intellectual difficulty in solving a mathematical problem, and this
empathy would itself still be a feeling.
2. The inter-personal similarity condition: there is no empathy unless the target’s and the
empathizer’s affective states stand in a similarity relation to each other (i.e. both
experience pain or both experience fear).
This is a necessary condition for a simulationist view of empathy, but not, as stated, for
a narrative view. Understanding the situation of the other person, being able to frame
it in a proper narrative, may lead A to be, for example, outraged at an injustice done
to B. B herself, however, may only be sad about the situation and not outraged. The
affective states involved may be different, or may have different phenomenal properties
(and necessarily do if empathy is itself its own affective state, since A is feeling empathy
and B is not). What needs to be similar, to some degree, is our understanding of the
situation. If B is sad because an accident totaled her car, but A feels outrage because he
thinks she has suffered some injustice, then we would have a misunderstanding rather
than a case of empathy. This means that empathy depends on A having the right story
about B’s situation.

10

Accordingly the idea of empathy as an affect is different from what Stueber (2008) calls “affective empathy”
– the vicarious sharing of an affect consistent with de Vignemont and Jacob’s affectivity condition.
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3. The vicarious state condition: the empathic state involves an “as if” or vicarious
affective states, generated by the empathizer’s imaginative portrayal of another
person’s affective state.
As indicated above, in some cases the empathic state may in fact be a real rather than
a pretend or vicarious state. My sadness and outrage about the injustice done to you
may be a heartfelt sadness and outrage. What is vicarious, if the empathic state is based
on simulation, is the situation that I pretend to place myself in (or the experience I
pretend to have) when I put myself in your shoes. But it seems possible for me to
forego simulation and E-imagination, and to simply imagine (or see) you in a particular
situation and to feel genuine sadness and outrage at the injustice done to you. In some
cases, however, e.g., with respect to pain, it may indeed involve a vicarious affective
state.
4. The ascription condition: there is no empathetic understanding unless the empathizer
knowingly ascribes the affective state to the target.
That there has to be some kind of ascription seems right, although it does not have to be
an ascription of an affective state (it could be an ascription of a cognitive state, as in the
case of empathizing with the intellectual difficulty someone is having). Furthermore,
as Zahavi and Overgaard point out, this condition does not distinguish empathy from
contagion since one can wince and tense up as the result of seeing someone else in
pain, but at the same time consciously ascribe this same affective state to the other.
5. The caring condition: the empathizer must be led to care about the target’s affective
life because of context.
Empathy is other-directed; it involves the comprehension of the other in the other’s
circumstances. Even if we do not care for the other person in a strong sense, empathy
requires that we be at least concerned or take interest in the other’s experience.
In addition, however, one maintains a distance between oneself and the other. “In
empathy, the experience you empathically understand remains that of the other. The
focus is on the other, the distance between self and other is preserved and upheld”
(Zahavi and Overgaard 2011, 6). This distance can be readily understood in terms of
narrative distance, a concept that goes back to Aristotle’s Poetics, and is much discussed
in recent narrative theory (see, e.g., Gallagher and Cole 2010). Even if I feel with
you the sadness and outrage about the injustice that you experience, I know that I am
not the one who has suffered the injustice; the situation is your situation. In terms of
narrative distance, I act as narrator (as I understand your context and situation), and
you occupy a narrated position.
In summary, one can conceive of empathy as being (1) a primary, non-reducible,
other-directed feeling of concern or interest that (2) is characterized by a clear
distinction between empathizer and the other person, that (3) targets the other’s
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situated experience and (4) consciously ascribes that experience specifically to that
other. Like de Vignemont et al., I take empathy to be something more than an
automatic mirroring or contagion, and something more than mindreading.11 For
empathy, however, narrative offers more resources than the simulation model; in
addition, it is more parsimonious in regard to the starting problem and the diversity
problem, and it makes sense developmentally. That narrative competency is necessary
for empathic understanding doesn’t mean that empathic understanding requires an
occurrent or explicit story telling: but it does require the ability to recognize others
in their detailed pragmatic and social contexts that are other than my own, and to
understand the other’s actions and affective states in that context, in a narrative way.
Our own actions, and the actions of others have intelligibility and begin to make
sense when we can place them in a narrative framework (see McIntyre 1981). Our
understanding of others and their situations, and hence the possibility of empathizing
with them, is not based on attempts to get into their heads in a mentalizing fashion,
since we already have access to their embodied actions and the rich worldly contexts
within which they act – contexts that can be translated into narratives that operate
to widen or make more specific the meaning/significance of actions and expressive
movements.
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